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This paper ie intended as a re-examination of current .thinking in
the social sciences about Lesotho and, by extension, has I think-
some relevance to the analysis of the social formations and
politics of those regions of Africa which Samir Amin has
characterized as the economies of the labour reserve, (l). By
insisting that migrant labour - which takes about *+0 per cent
of Lesotho's adult, active, male population - is the key to
understanding Lesotho's predicaments nothing new is being said. (2)
Furthermore the work of social scientists and planners in
Lesotho reveals a fundamental awareness of the dependent nature
of the S^ tttirtfrre^ fl. e(^ onamv on the Republic of South Africa.
However most of thisHjvtnking tends to adopt a passive stance vis-
a-vis the basic premises of imperialism, the dynamics of underevelop-
ment and the formulation of alternative deTelopment strategies
which do not take current market relationships as a given. In
this sense, the stance of social science is apologetic. These
apologetics can, I think, be shown to rest on the dualist model
of economic growth: a model which makes no direct claims to com-
prehend the "laws of motion" of development but yet a model which .
serves as a guideline for an approach to the problem of underde-
velopment which is passive rather than active and which demands
that development be measured from the perspective of the status,
quo. **>
A basic trait of current analysis of Lesotho is the use of a type
of circular reasoning. For example: the pressure of population on
land leads to soil erosion which increases the pressure of population
on land. This form of reasoning is frequently used to "explain "
Lesothos dependent status. Certainly, at one level, such explan-
ations are true. That they fail to provide an historical and genetic
understanding of a- given situation will be regarded by many as an
irre]cvant objection. Such was not the intention of these studies.
The only relevant criteria are those which can be used to assess
the degree to which such studies illuminate reality and give a better
understanding of current predicaments. In a word: they tell it as it
is. But, at another level, such analyses obscure what they purport
to illuminate. ('*) This is the level at which such analyses are used
as a basis for policy making: for defining plnn targets and, even,
outlining development strategies. These tasks are inherently political.
Not in the banal sense that they are the tasks of the politicans.
But in the sense -;hat the shaping of development strategy demands
assessing alternatives. It involves asking: why did this situation
c« mcabout and not another one ?
7l) Samir Arain 'Underdevelopment and Dependance in Black Africa1 in
Journal of Peace Research 1972, 2, and S. Amin Le Developpement Inegal
pp 287-291.
(2) "The guiding principle (of colonial rule) was that the territories
exist to supply the requirements of the Unions labour markets, without
any claim for reciprocal benefits and regardless of the effects on the
vitality, the tribal organization or the economic condition of the territ'
ories themselves" Leonard Barnes The New Boer, War 1932 quoted in Jack
Halpern South Africa's Hostages 1965. "
(3) I am greatly indebted here to professor Archie Mafeje of the Insti-
tute of Social Studies, The Hague and specifically to his paper "Th*.
Fallacy/ of Dual SconcmU^ revisited".
(*0 For an analysis of the "vicious-circle" explanation see Tamas Saentes
The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (1971) chapters 2 & 3.
More specifically, such circular reasoning tends to neglect
'three factors which are vital for assessing development
strategies: -
(l)What are the historical circumstances which assured the
dominance of an external market for labour, commodities and
evencapital ? Having identified these, a host of questions
then emerge that are more specific in nature. For example,,
what is the institutional connection between the local market
for commodities (eg:Lesotho's trading stations)and the
recruitment of migrant labour ?
(2)How does capital in the "core" areas of economic growth -
in Lesotho's case primarily the mining and manufacturing sectors
of the Republic of Couth Africa, ensure the conditions for its
expanded reproduction ? Will, for example, the use of an
increasingly capital-intensive technology in South Africa lead
to an increasing marginalizatitiiQ of the Basotho ?
(3)How can the size a* Lesotho's surplus -generated by migrant
labour but accumulated as capital in the Republic, be estimated ?
What are the consequences of this calculation for estimating
the opportunity-cost of migrant labour ?
The paper that follows is divided into three sections. The
first section begins with a description of some salient features
of the political economy of Lesotho and proceeds to analyse
rhceat readings of Lesotho with special emphasis on the way in
which Lesotho's "dependent" status is examined and, in particular,
the way in wich the phenomenon of migrant labour is treated.
The second section attempts a closer examination of the historical
development of migrant labour from Lesotho to South Africa.
The third section relates the structure of migrant labour to
comparative analyses of migrant labour and to the general
line of cleavage that separates dual analyses of economic develop-
ment 5ronr"/*l^wr3^analyses of the de\ olopment of under development.
A. Background to Lesotho's Economy
Lesotho is an arid, mountain kingdom in the heart of South Africa.
It is situated in t\ii middle of South Africa's most mountainous
region - the Drakenberg mountains - which rise to a height of
nearly twelve thousand feet. To the south and east the land
falls away sharply to Natal and Cape Province and, to the
west, falls away aiore gently to the Caledon river which marks
the boundary between Lesotho and the Orange Free State.
The total population of the kingdom of Lesotho is estimated at
just over 9tie million people of whom, a; any one time, an
estimated 150,000 are living and working in South Africa. Nearly
all the rest of the%Vpvu^Lation are employed either in agriculture
or by government.
Apart fromthe strip of fertile land on the east bank of the
Caledon, soil fertility is low and soil erosion is^widespread.
The principal products of Lesotho are maize, ( 1 C C S S | 3 « B & ) , wheat,
wool and mohair and cattle which are produced both for the
domestic market and for export.
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Although, geographically, Lesotho lies within the temperate zrone, the
climate is exceedingly intemperate with extremes of temperature, erratic
rainfall. Life in these conditions hae toughened the 3asotho physically
and one reason why so.many Basotho work on the pit face of South Africa's
mines is that Basotho are farae4 *or their physical toughness.
Although Lesotho became an independent state in 1966 under the leader-
ship of Chief Jonathon, who retained power thoough a coup d'etat in
1970, Lesotho is a near-perfect example of "flag independence".
Economically and politically, Lesotho is a hostage of South Africa.
As a part of the South African customs area, Lesotho'-s customs tarriffs
on imports are levied at South African ports and the South African rand
circulated freely within the kingdom. South Africans occupy strategic
posts in Lesotho's government service. While the United Kingdom still
subvents Lesotho's economy, Lesotho is increasingly dependent on South
African capital.
The most dynamic element in Lesotho's economy today is the tourist
industry, which has undergone an unparalleled growth in the last -jthftee j_9a
years - from an estimated 5*000 tourist in 197o to an estimated 2 V , w -^
iftti^fS, The Tourist boom has brought about a rapid increase in sales
of Lesotho's cottage and handicrafts. A major force behind this expansion
is the Lesotho National Development Qorporation (LNDC) which has estab-
lished in 1966. Its first director, Dr.Anton Rupert, a South African in-
dustrialist, was supplied by the South African Government. As a non-tax-
paying corporation the LNDC has had access to capital in South Africa
on favourable terraSand the prestige and contacts of Dr.Rupert have
certainly helped. Between 1967 and 1972 the LNDC is estimated to have pro-
vided 2o million rand (5) (1 rand = C 1.^0). The LNDC engages in both
joint ventures and in outright ownership of enterprises. It is a success-
ful enterprise in i.ts own right and in the year 1971/1972 made a net
profit of R.838,591 rand on net assets of R. 1.610.209- (6)
A candle factory, a carpet factory, a pottery workshop, a tyre-retreading
plant and substantial investment 4.n the Holiday Inn Hotel have been some
of LNDC's successful ventures. The LNDC is fully backed by the government
and both the Prime Minister and tbe Minis fcer 6f finance, Commerse and
Industry are represented on the board. It offers to the investor
"concessions on taxes, land and building leases, exclusive manufacturing
licenses and the repatriation of capital and profits that are among the
most generous in the world." (7)
The strategy of the LNDC is one of close integration in the South African
capital market. Wlion Ds Enpo:^ 16ft \\i.a iJuffl. no •Ci.L.'tfuLui1 uf the LNDC
ono of hio oubui'JiiieiLub - WliiuiuJ—ytm Gian • waa appuiiiluu in his seead.
But T)r ftnprH; bin oontinuod hie work fux LJMJIIUJ. In 1972 the Economic
Development Bank for Equatorial and Southern Africa (EDESA) was establish-
ed with administrative offices in MaWuru ana head office in Zurich. (8).
EDESA is designed to raise capital internationally for investment in
South Africa's neighbour states. By August, 1973» fl 10 million had been
raised "largely through the personal efforts of Dr. Rupert." (9)
Furthermore, the Lesotho (national) bank is heavily involved in the
South African capital market. The Lesotho Bank announced in March this
year that :Lt will create fixed interest Development bonds for sale in
the Johannesburg capital market at 7% (ie. a bond with a .face value of
(5). Alan Hake 'Lesotho: Growth Points bring hope to a poor country'
African Development, February, 1973.
(6) Lesotho National Development Corporation, Annual Report, 1972
(7) LNDC advertisement, African Development. February 1973
(8) African Research Bulletin, September 15-October 14, 1972
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R 100 will be sold for R 71 and redeemed after five years at R VDO). (lo)
However, major industrial development has not materialized. Lesotho's
great dream has been the Oxbow project (officially known as Malibamatso)
a scheme to dam the sources of the Malibamatso and create both hydro-
electric and water supply. The world bank has not been enthusiastic
fcout he scheme although the UNDP gave a grant of R. 2 million for a
feasibility study in 1969- Lesotho pins hopes on South African capital
but South Africa has no^,as yet, committed herself. (11) It is hoped
that the Malibamatso project would help Lesotho's employment situation
and provide other residual benefits. 12) But this is in the future.
Nor have hopes of substantial exploitation ef diamonds and other mineral
ressurces materialised.
The economic structure of modern Lesotho is surely one of the most
dependent of any state with formal political independence. According
to the Development Plan, per capita income is estimated at R. 63- The
primary sector, almost exclusively agriculture, contributes 4l.O9fj of
gross demestic product, the secondary sector 2.4# and the tertiary
sector 56.6#. As was mentioned earlier, the order of magnitude of the
total earnings of Basotho migrant labour is approximately the same as
that of Lesotho's GDP. While formally remitted earnings of migrants
figure as export earnings in Lesotho's balance of payments the calcul-
ation has littler meaning in a country where the secondary sector is
almost non-existent: cash earnings are spent primarily on imports.
The foreign trade account of Lesotho is someting of a nightmare: -
External Trade (13)
'000 Rands
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Exports 4,690 4,387 4,168 3,380 4,069 3,716 2,197
Imports 17,525 22,917 23,800 23,938 23,907 22,876 27,997
The foreign trade gap has progressively widened in the last seven years.
The gap has been filled partly by remittances of migrant labour, partly
by foreign aid and partly by direct grants from the United Kingdom.
One third of imports are of ifiood and tobacco and, in the words of the
plan "only a small part of imported commodities is;-used as imports for
production."
A look at the account of government revenue and expenditure reveals that
the budgetary deficit is equal to 17# of government expenduture. Expen-
diture on civil service salaries eats up about k$% of total government
expenditure. This situation is not new. One observer has remarked that
throughout the colonial period "any increase in purchasing power was
largely concentrated in the hands of African and European civil servants
who, with an increase in income would have a greater tendency to buy
import and whose savings would be almost entirely channelled off into
the Republic of South Africa. (14)
(9) African Research Bulletin, July 15-August 14, 1973
(10) Africa Research Bulletin, February 15-March 14, 1973
(11) "So far the problem baa been that tlie aaxioum price offered fcr
water by South Africans io.well below the minimum.at wHich it would pay
Lesotho to produce it" Private Correspondeance from Percy Selwyn.
(.12) Among the residual benefits is a ski resort in the Maluti Mountains
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Between 19&5 a n d 1966 current expenditure of central government on
wages and salaries increased by 21.1#. Lesotho's long-term debt obligat
ions are also quite out of proportion to the national income. As at-iii
$£$&&&*H debt repayable in foreign currency alone totalled 7,731,000 $
Section One: Current Thinking about Development in Lesotho.
A. Industrial Development: Spatial and Social Dualism.
A penetrating and inspiring analysis of industrial development strategy
for Lesotho has been made by Selwyn. (15) While this analysis is only
preliminary it deserves intensive study by all concerned with economic
development in Lesotho specifically and the analysis of labour reserve
economies generally. Selwyn's analysis is based on three types of dualism:
spatial dualism, sectoral dualism and social dualism. The starting point
for his analysis is that Lesotho's economy cannot be studied in isolation
but only as a part of the wider study of the South African economy as a
whole. The historical and institutional ties that link Lesotho to the
Republic of South Africa and, tenuously, to Swaziland and Botswana are
so strong as to demand this.
Selwyn emphasizes the factors that tend to drain off both labour and
capital from Lesotho to the "core" areas of growth in the Republic.
On the basis of an analysis of the projection of the market for labour
in South African economy, Selwyn puts forward the cautious hypothesis that
Lesotho can benefit from the anomoly that, although she is part of the
labour market of the econray of South Africa, she is not subject to the
job-reservation policy of apartheid %&aQ£$gtis<3d in the Republic of
South Africa. But Selwyn *i«JajMLXjsi« impedlmente- to a strategy of indu-
strial development that would aim at providing .skilled labour at a price
below that required for white, skilled labour in the Republic. Such impe-
diments as lack of entrepreneurship, the absence of credit and financial
institutions for investing in Lesotho, lack of management skills and
information of market possibilities in South Africa all operate to
obstruct a policy of economic growth. Essentially, Lesotho's economic
position at present is that she is a part of the subsistence sector
of the dual economy of South Africa - a spatial duali.sm. But this
situation is exacerbated by the social dualism that stems from the
apartheid policies of the Republic and effects the economy of Lesotho:
particularly, white domination of its trade and market" links with the
Republic.
B. Interpretations of Lesotho's economy.
Economic analyses of Lesotho are agreed on two p)oints. One is that the
economy is dependent on South Africa whose mines, farms and service
sector provide over hQ per cent of employment for the de facto population
of Lesotho. The otherr pointy, of agreement is that no alternative strate-
gy other than a perp-atuaiuation og this dependence is conceivable in the
near future. There are, of course, variations and nuances within this
broad agreement. In one interpretation, the absence of industrialisation
"where natural ""snowball will be supplemented by a r t i f i c i a l means"
Alan Rake Op. Cit.
(13) ECA Summary, 1971
(1*0 Michael Ward 'Independence for Lesotho ?• J.M..A.S. 5,3 1967, page
359
(15) Percy Selwyn. 'The Dual Economy Transcending N.ational Frontiers:
The case of Industrial Development in Lesotho', IPi5 Communication 105
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in Lesotho is unexplained: it emerges deue ex machina. (16) The develop-
ment strategy here advocated io one that strengthens the bonds with
South Africa: -
The economic prospects of Lesotho are dim and
in the short run it has virtually no hope of
becoming commercially viable or independent of
South Africa and foreign aid. The needs of both
countries thus hang together and sound economic
reasons dictate that everything possible should
be done to strengthen and improve the links which
have already been forged between the two nations. (1?)
In a second interpretation, the lack of industrialization is related to' -.
the "pull" on production factors of South African industrial growth. (18)
But the strategy here advocated is the same. An active government policy
"implies the modernization of the economic strtlcture and the gradual dis-
apperance of the subsistence economy" which will, in turn, increase
Lesotho's dependence on the market eaonom y of South Africa. Selwyn's
interpretation, as we have seen, is based on a less sanguine view of the
long-term demand for foreign labour in the Republic of South Africa: it
would be "unwise for Lesotho to plan on the assumption that her unemployed
can continue to be exported to the Republic." (19)
The difference in interpretation and strategical implications can, I
think, be related to the time perspective. The shorter the time perspective,
the greater the tendency to accept Lesotho'e economic status as axiomatic
and the greater the tendency to advocate a strategy which will integrate
Lesotho more firmly in the South African labour and capital markets.
C. Migrant Labour
Within the framework of this general view of the Lesothan econmy, how ex-
actly is migrant labour interpreted? Leistner has nan interesting ana-
lysis of the development of migrant labour derived partly from figures ob-
tained from the records of population census in Lesotho and partly from
information from the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines.
The latter indicate that in 190^ the number of migrant worker in the gold
mines was only 2,3oo - a fugnre which rose slowly to 2o,9oo in 193o. Two
factors then caused a dramatic rise in migrant labour to the gold mines.
One was the effect of the world economic crisis and the other was a se-
rious drought in Lesotho. This led to an increase in the rate of mine re-
cruitment by one-third in 1931 alone. The upward trend continued and, by
, had reached a height of over 5o,ooo. (2o)
A number of authorities have attested to the damaging effect of migrant
labour on the social and economic structure of Lesotho - ranging from
missionaries' concern with the pernicious effects of migrant labour on the
spiritual valuel and sexual mores to the concern of agriculturalists and
anthropologists who have pointed out that rural development is severely
tl6) Michael Ward 'Economic Independence for Lesotho?' op« cit. p.359
(1?) Ibid page 368
Il8) G.M;E. Leistner "Lesotho: Economic Structure & Growth"
Communications of the African Institute No 5, 1966
(19)/Selwyn op.cit. page 8.
(2o) Leistner Op. cit.
hampered by the virtual absence of the able-bodied male population. (21)
The Labour that returns to Lesotho is tired, sick, crippled and infirm.
It is also locked into a pattern of recurrent migration by a variety of
factors: low level of skills and the shere poverty of the migrants for
example. (22) Furthermore, a large part of the migrant labour has, histo-
rically, been emmigrant labour. By computing a natural population increase
of 1.7 per cent p.a. in the period 1936-1956 and then comparing the cen-
sus figures of de jure population for 1936 with the figures for de jure,
population dSf 1956, Leistner estimates that at least l4o,ooo Basotho have
been permanently absorbed in South Africa - a brawn and brain drain of
incredible magnitude given a 1972 population of a littler over one million
(de jure). Some authorities, Leistner included, would regard this as an
underestimate.
Interpretations of migrant labour in Lesotho have focussed much attention
on the factors which re-inforce this migration and produce a type of vi-
cious circle. In analysing non-development in Lesotho Sandra Wallman, for
example, argues that non-development is a function of three mutually-inter-
related factors: - 1) Poverty - 2) Migration - 3) Ideology. The pressure-
of population on land forces the peasant to look for work outside the
borderes of Lesotho. Migration disrupts the family and wider organisation
of chieftanship. Furthermore, work in Johannesburg and contact with the .
urban culture creates expectations and wants that village life cannot
satisfy. The ideology or cultural climate of village life creates/engen-
ders apathy. The village and its mores is denigrated by the migrantas
bening not 'semate' (smart). (23)
D..Lesotho's Political Development.
Political studies of Lesotho tend to involve a circularity by which cur-
rent development strategies and political' constellations are "explained11
by reference to the absence of a meaningful alternative. Studies of
Lesotho's political development frequently wmphasize that, almost alone
in sub-Saharan Africa, Lesotho is a homogeneous nation. The Basotho speak
one laguage, have no significant ethnic divisions and have been united po-
litically for over one hundred years. (2*0 The history of Lesotho in the
twentieth century has been dominated by one threat - the threat of in-
corporation into the Republic of South Africa. In fact, the Act of Union
of 1911 made specific provision for this incorporation and the British,
in the face of South African pressure,, geared their administrative po-
licies around such an eventual incorporation. And yet, in the face of
this challenge to their existence as an independent people, the Basotho
diet not unite. .Modern politics in Lesotho have been both divisive and
bitter.
According to the foremost authority on the politics of Lesotho,
Weisfelder, the explanation of this paradox is to be sought in a c.
deep conflict within the society as to the nature cf the Basotho
(21) Sandra Wallman Take Out Hunger: Two case studies in Rur.al Develop-
ment in Basutoland (1969)
£SS)Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Eco.aomic
Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Afric~ Tl955)
(Thomlinson Report)
(22) Hugh Ashton: The Basutho: a social study of traditional & modern
Lesotho (2nd edition, 1967)
T23) Sandra Wallman 'Conditions of Non-Development: The case of Lesotho
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nation and its position in Southern African and world affaire. (25)
•The Basutoland National Party came to power after the General Election
of 196s. Its leader, Chief Leabua Jonathon, became Lesotho's first
Prime Minister. The BNP is buttressed by the catholic church and support-
ed by a majority of the chiefs. It tends towards a definition of Basotho
identity in terms of a perspective which focusses on southern Africa to
the exoluaiou of the reet of.Africa, and which is prepared to have a
"dialogue" with Verwoerd and white South Africa. By contrast the opposi-
ion Basutoland Congress Party is a "grievance party" that gathers to-
gether the grievances of the migrant workers, the teachers and the unskil**
led workers and expresses virulent opposition to everything the govern-
ment proposes. Far from conceptualising Basotho identity in terms of the
present power structure in southern Africa, the BCP articulates a strategy
which takes international goals as a "starting point." In a recorded
interview with the BCP leader, Ntsu Mokheiile, Weisfelder notes that when
asked to imagine the place of Lesotho within a liberated South Africa,
Mokhehle saw no need for the continuancen of a separate Basutho State.(26)
On Friday, January 30th 1970, while election results were coming in that
indicated a victory for the opposition BCP (27) Chief Jonathon declared a
state of Emergency and seized power. Given the size of the ideological
"gap" between BNP and BCP many had prophesied an authoritarian trend in
Lesothan politics. (28).
Setting this analysis against the basic facts of Lesotho's dependence
on the Republic, political analysts tend to argue that the only political
strategy that is workable is one that accepts the long-term, structural
characteristic of migrant labour as a continuing factor in Lesotho's eco-
nomy. In essence, there is no alternative strategy. A BCP victory, had the
Republic of South Africa permitted it - and there is some evidence that
Verwoerd might have accepted a B6P government (29) would certainly have
conducted a more activist foreign policy, with diplomatic exchange and
aid from the socialist countries. But the BCP could not offer an alter-
na tive economic policy to Chief Jonathon's party. Mchkehle would have
been forced to rely on the same kind of piecemeal improvements that the
BNP government were carrying out and are described in the current five
year plan. (3°)
The key to the argument is that, given the structural nature of contempo-
rary migrant labour and the dependent nature of Lesotho's economy, there
is no development strategy open to Lesotho other than a policy of amlerio-
rating the worsk features of the present situation.
E. Lesotho's Current Development Plan.
Lesotho's current Development Plan shows a keen awareness of the problem
of migrant labour. In the words of Chief Jonathon "Lesotho is becoming
a reservoir of unskilled, cheap labour for South Africa with little hope
of creating an indigenous base for economic development. (31)
Journal of Development Studies, Vol 8 No 2 January, 1972
(24) B. Makalo Khaketla Lesotho 197o: an African coup under the Micro-
scope (1972) pages 1-2 & 33^
(25) R.F. Weisfelder 'Defining Political Purpose in Lesotho' paper to
African Studies Associaltion, October 1968 and 'Lesotho - an unstable
irritant within South Africa' African studies Association, 197o
'(26) Weisfelder 'Definging Political Purpose in Lesotho1 Op. cit.
(27) Khaketla Op.Cit. page 211- This was Mokhehle's view in the mid-601s.
(28) I must emphasize here that Weisfelder categorically rejects the
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The analysis is somewhat ambivalent about the role of labour migration.
On the one hand it describes the positive benefits in the shape of the
receipts for repatriated earnings from South Africa and puts forward such
arguments as that "Basotho are getting used to working for money and for
improved standards of living." But, essentially, the analysis emphasizes
the negative consequences of migrant labour and hints at the degree to
which migrant labour acts as a non-way valve for the export of Lesotho's
national surplus: -
The order of magnitude of the total earnings of the
Basutho migrant labourers ( *O million Rand for
1965/66) is comparable with the Gross Domestic
Product of the country (55,6 M. rand for 1967/68).(32)
Yet the key target of the plan - the creation of 10,000 - 15,000 jobs over
af five-year period - makes no attempt to tackle the problem of migrant •
labour. The strategy adopted is one in which migrant labour, as a nation-
al problem, will somehow wither om the vine: -
For the next five years this policy concentrates on
the annual increase of the labour force, which
(estimated at an average of 4,000 males and 2,000
females) seem to be in line with the expected
annual increase of the employment opportunities
in the country. This will provide an indirect solu-
tion to Lesotho's almost entire present dependency
on uncertain employment opportunities outside the
country. If the annual increase of labour can be
absorbed in relative sound emplyment opportunities
in the country, the relative importance of this pro-
blem will be gradually reduced, in the long run, to
such an extent that it will eventually cease to be
a major problem. Moreover the continuous expansion
of domestic employment opportunities will stimulate
a repatriation flow. (35)
The economic reasonging here is somewhat hard to follov. The distribution
of the male labour force for the year 1969 was: -
Emplyment in Agriculture
Paid Employment in Lesotho 7%
Employment in South Africa ^5#
(in other words, only 13% of paid employment was,
in 1969» inside Lesotho).
facile and racialist arguments of Der Wyk 'Lesotho: a Political Study1
Coramuncations of the Africa Institute No 7 (1967) van Wyk sees political
authoritarianism as an inherent factor in black Africa. Weisfelder stress-
es, rather, the temptations to violence and authoritarianism in a situa-
tion where the pre-conditions of democratic' pluralism - internal and ex?
ternal - are lacking.
(29) Khaketla Op. Cit. page 212
(30) Lesotho First Five Year Development Plan 197o/71 - 197V75 (1970)
(31) Development Plan Ibid foreword
(32) Ibid page 6
(33) Development Plan Ibid pages 21-22
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Even if the next two Five Year Plans could sustain the rate of increase
of domestic employment opportunities in the plan, the proportion of ex-
ternal paid employment in \9$B would still be more than 5o% of nil paid
employment. The"long run" here is very long. Furthermore the argument that
the creation of new employment opportunities within Lesotho will stimulate
a repatriation flow of Basotho from South Africa is somewhat unclear. The
overall target of growth - 5 per cent per annum - may induce some Basotho
not to sign mining contracts but unless the lo,ooo - 15,ooo new jobs in
turn stimulate new employment opportunities this will simply increase the
competition for work in Lesotho. Furthermore, we would expect a low
multiplier effect in an economy with a high marginal propensity to import.
There are indications that, given the aesuption of the plan, the growth
targets are set somewhat high. Thus, for example, the plan indicates no
clear policy towards the present system of land tenure which, in the
plan analysis is considered one of the structural obstacles to economic
development. (3*0 For example, in the sectoral survey
 t the Leribe Dry
Farming project i reviewed. It is described as a scheme which will "test
the suitability of a semi-cooperative farm organization system, designed
to pernit rapid increases of productivity without conflicting with the
present system of land tenure." (35) Given this basic ambiguity, such
overall agricultural targets as an increase of maize and sorghum yields
per acre of 62,3% in the plan period and a 700# increase in the consump-
tion of fertilizer appear optimistic targets.
Another characteristic of the Development plan is the absence of a clear
strategy vis-a-vis the Customs Area of Southern Africa. The industrial
development strategy indicated in the plan is one of import substitution
for the domestic market. The plan suggests that there is a potential mar-
ket for handieraf industries, weaving, pottery etc. whic, by operating on
a small scale and by using local materials, will, promote employment and
serve as growth points throughout the country. The plan also points to the
alleged advantages of Lesotho's free access to the South African Market
for manufactures "in addition to the possibility of applying limited
protection to its home market under the revised Customs Agreement with
Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland." (36) However, the planners do not
consider that large-scale industrial production is practicable because of
the high marginal propensity to import.
While the decision not to embark on a policy of large-scale industrializa-
tion is problably based on a sound assessment of the political relation-
ship of Lesotho to South Africa, the economic argument is less secure.
If South Africa is a free trade area with respect to the movement of
capital then, as Selwyn argues, there are good prima facie reasons for
an development strategy which would make use of the anomoly that South
African job reservation does not apply in Lesotho. Hence, by investing ;
heavily in education, Lesotho might offer a skilled labour force at rates
below those prevailing for skilled, white labour in the Republic. The
argument would, of course, only apply to industries sited in Lesotho.
But Selwyn's argument (37) perhaps takes insufficient account of the
political relationship between Lesotho and South Africa. Investors who
think they can use Lesotho to create what white South Africans are fond
(3*0Both Selwyn an G.Winai-Strom who have provied valuable comments and
critisism of this paper do not consider that, taken as a wjole, the exist-
ing system of land tenure is an obstacle to economic development.
(35) Development Plan Op.Cit. page 19.
(36) Ibid page 117
(37) Selwyn Op. Cit.
- 11 -
of calling a South African "Hong Kong" tend to be given short thrift,(38)
An industrial strategy which emphasizes tourism and handicrafts may show
a keen awareness of current political realities.
Section Two: Migrant Labour - a closer look
The first problem encountered in looking closer at the history and
structure of migrant labour from Lesotho to the Republic of South Africa
is the absence of solid data. There is no reliable record of the total
number of Basotho whor are working in South Africa. There are parial re-
cords and there arc concise data for certain types of labour contracts
but the overall total has to be computed and much, consequently, depends
on the assumptions underlying the computation. (39) Furthermore, this
analysis is based entirely on secondary sources.
The labour Department in Masuru - Lesotho's capital - gives the follow-
ing statistic on recent recruiting to the gold mines and colleries of
South Africa: -
Wage* Employment in South African Mines (*+o)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Recruitment 80,895 85,26^ 75,331 80,712 86,^20 97,185 83,053
Employment 67,277 80,951 7 7 , ^ 80,310 83,053 - 87,38^ 99,365
Current estimates of the total de jure population working in South Africa
are of the order of^l5Q.000. It is also estimated that non-mining migrant
labour is employe^Tnstgriculture and service sectors. Projections of
the demand for labour in the South African economy indicate a tendency
toward stagnation, particularly in the mining and agricultural sectors.
(*+l) But the figures given above indicate an upward trend. It is diffic-
ult to relate changes in South Africa's demand for labour to the specific
demand for Basotho labour.
As was outlined above Leistner indicates two factors that account for the
growth of migrant labour from Lesotho (a) The depression of the early
thirties, (b) A serious drought in Lesotho. The decline in world trade
that followed the collapse of the speculative boomof the 1920 ies1 had
catastrophic effects on Lesotho's export earnings:-
(38) In December, 1972, Lesotho's Prime Minister, Chief Jonathon, accused
South Africa of interfering so as to cancel three development projects
under negociation between Lesotho and Japan: a motor assembly plant,
a Honda assembly plant and a flour mill. Africa Research Bulletin, 3rd
March, 1973.
(39) The main sources I have used are the Department of Labour, Maseru
which are based on figures given by the South African recruiting authori-
ties, the Annual Report of thse Borard of Directors of the Mine Labour
Organization of South Africa (Wenela) and secondary sources.
(*+o) Source: Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data '
Lesotho, 1971
Selwyn, Op. Cit. pages 7-9
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In 1928, 12.725.153 lb of wool was valued at £610.650
and 1.921.189 lb of mohair at £139. W .
In 1932, ll.832.39i lb of wool was valued at £105,^35
and 1.033.863 lb of mohair at £ I0.I36
As we have seen, Leistner arguet that, from a slow start in 1904, '
employment in mining grew slowly and, in I93o, still only amounted
to 20,900. The expansion in the 1930's was followed by expansion in
alternative employment opportunities in the South African economy
in the 19^0's.
A look at the figures of passes issued for labour to the Republic
between 192^ and 1933 reveal no observable trend for the total
return of passes issued for mine labour:
Pirn Report Ibid Appendix VIII. Unfortunately I have not
been able to obtain a month- by - month break-down of the annual
totals such as are given in the Winela Annual Report Op. Cit.
Year
i
? 1921
t 1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
193o
1931
1932
1933
RETURN
M
Gold.
13,309
15,^90
18,995
21,571
24,162
25,5^2
25,731
DF PASSES :
I
Coal.
1,854
764
694
572
254
47
72
[SSUED TO
Labour
N E
Diamonds
9,697
9,269
9,016
6fJ83
2,434
62
BASUTO TO
S
Total.
33,853
23,947
26,358
32,002
22,912
3^,504
24,880
25,523
28,705
28,526
26,850
25,751
25,803
ENTER THE
Agri-
culture.
12,301
11,578
15,613
14,83**
13,19**
19,217
9,507
7,353
13,483
12,778
12,099
12,678
15,237
UNION (43)
Railway
con-
struction.
2,082
2,032
79**
862
?33
659
173
284
449
185
-
Miscel-
laneous
labour.
20,843
20,016
33^37
40,929
^3,253
41,484
23,407
20,718
32,125
23,298
27,802
19,628
10,816
Total
Labour
69,079
57,665
76,202
88,627
79,592
95,864
57,947
53,878
74,762
64,787
66,751
5^,057
51,856
visit-
ing
49,192
59.5S9
33,194
41;841
31,290
38,905
6o,l73
57,962
37,364
^8,235
36,955
38,010
57,651
Grand
Total
118,271
117,192
109,396
130,468
110,882
134,769
118,140
111,840
112*126
113,022
103,706
96,067
109,507
Amount of money
sent to Basuto-
land from gold
mines by de-
ferred pay and
through remit-
tance Agency
£
35.054
30,006
36,973
49,103
73,394
87,979
156,182
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Note. - (l) No statistics available for specified mine labour or re-
mittances and deferred pay before 1927.
(2) The amount of remittances and defercd pay is what has ac-
tually been paid out. A large number of natives remit
through the post and no statistics are avialable for
this.
It is interesting to compare the figures for pass returns export figur-
es for Lesotho's two principal exports, wool and mohair in the same
period:
Year
1921
1922
1923
192*+
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
EXPORTS (44)
Wool
1 b
quantity '
12,826,772.
12,829,330
10,264,894
11,577,384
11,721,411
12,131,574
18,906,789
12,726,153
12,937,198
9,729,169 •
9,325,140
11,832,391
9,864,.043 .
£
value
211,981
377,333
513,644
715,665
469,315
427,047
508,687
610,750
436,083
156,601
98,304
105,435
196,146
Mohair
1 b
quantity
2,330,066
2,326,367
2,001,564
2,455,950
1,958,877
2,156,603
2,132,907
1,921,189
1,961,746
942,725
1,241,743
1,033,863
1,926,180
£
value
63,756
104,o33
119,646
183,076
119,285
121,098
139,226
139,484
94,352
21,837
21,442
10,136
26,697
There is no clear correlation between export earnings on wool and
mohair and variations in the nembers of labour passes issued. Such
a corralation might have been expected if production for export
and migrant labour are regarded as alternative sources of cash
earnings. The junp in recruitment between 1925 and 1926 may, however,
have been caused by the poor returns for wool and mohair in 1925 •
In sum, the arguments suggesting a "gradual growth" of migrant labour
in this period are not substantiated by available evidence. This
suggests the need for another way of conceptualising the dynamics of
labour migration in Lesotho.
What is the underlying mechanism that "pull" migrant labour from the
subsistence economy? Leistner, ae we saw, argued that migrant labour
starts at the beginning of this century with recruitment to the mines
and expands and diversifies with the growth and diversification of
the South African economy. What is striking in this interpretation is
the absence af any discussion of the factors that (a) promoted South
(44) Pim Report Op. Cit. Appendix V
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African economic expansion generally and (b) the specific "push" and
"pull" factors that affected the flow of migrant labour from Lesotho
to South Africa. Furthermore, though -{&& is a minor point, census .. • .r
returns do not support the argument that mine recruitement was the
only source of employment in South Africa at the beginning of the
century. (^ 5)
But a more vital ommission is the absence of any discussion of the e-
conomic history of Lesotho in the nineteenth century. Why did labour
begin to migrate from Lesotho? The last quarter of the nineteenth
century witnessed the opening up of the gold and diamond mines in
South Africa: part of a procc-ss - the understanding of which is vital
to any understanding of the development ox capitalism in South Africa.
In raising the question of why did labour migrate from Lesotho to
South Africa we cannot avoid encountering two colliding traditions of
economic analysis. Hence a slight theoretical digression is necessary.
According to what I will term the apologtic tradition•in economic
thought, the transition from feudalism to capitalism is explained
by those factors that engender capitalist development. The question -
why did labour migrate to South Africa ? - is, according^.to this trad-
ition not very meaningful. The question is answered by reference to \ .
the automatic "pull" of the growth poles on the subsistence sector.
The peasant in the subsistence sector, on the basis of a rational cal-
culation of his economic resources, finds the opportunity cots of
labour in the modern sector lower than the opportunity costs of labour
in the traditional economy. The more so if, as Lewis has argued, there
is a surplus of labour in the traditional economy. Honee the question
why does the Basotho peasant migrate translates into the question:
why does the Basotho peasant behave rationally ?
But according to the Marxist traditi.cn of econmic thought the transi-
tion to capitalism requires one basic condition - the creation of a
labour market. C^6) Hence a process by which the Basotbo begin to sell
their labour on the market •••
 tt process of prletarianization - must
be set in motion. Marx does not f\rgue that pre-capitalist modes of •
production are inherently inferior.'Th.? process of primitive accumula-
tion must be historically specified. On entirely abstract grounds
there is, according to this tradition, no theoretical case for the
argument that growth in the demand fo;.- labour in South Africa would
automatically pull labour out of the subsistence economy. It is,
indeed, theoretically possible to F.rgue that pre-capitalist production
is more "efficient" than capitalism. The reward to the factors of pro-
duction are simply different. The reproductive costs of land use are
higher but the costs of other productive factors lower.
According bo the Basutoland Census of 23rd April, 19lli the total
number of Basotho employed at .nines in South Africa was 20,225 while
totil "persons in service other than mines" was 9,889 ie. already,in
1911, one third of Lesotho's migrant labour is employed in the non-
mining sectors. But the 1920s this figure had risen to approx. 5o%.
(46) Maurice Dobb Studies in the Development off Capitalism (1972 edi~
tion)page ?.
(^ 7) I am here indebeted to an exegesis of P-P.Rey ^Sur I1articulation
des modes de production1 in P-P Ray Lea Alliances de Classes (1975)
by Inger Boesen, Asger Christensen. Michael Harbsmeier and Sten Rehdsr
'Produktionsformernes samspil: fsrkapitaiistiske produktionsmaders
integration i kapitalismen1 (the interrelationships of forms of pro-
duction: the integration of pre-capitalist modes of production in
capitalism).
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The origins of migrant labour in Lesotho - some hypotheses
In the absence of an economic history of Lesotho in the nineteenth cen-
tury it ia necessary to invent one. There do, however, exist certain data
around which further hypotheses can be constructed. (48)
The earliest records of migrant labour since the consolidation of the
Bacotho nation by MoeShoesh in the second quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury stem from the 196O's:
Labour migration is not new to the Basuto and is,
in fact, nearly as old as their contact with Europeans.
During the famines and the troubled times of the
Free State wars (intermittently from 1851 to i860)
nubber of men sought employment with the Europeans
in Natal and the Cape for money to buy__£ood. After
the political settlement of l§j&8,'w6rU abroad became
more regular, and considerable scope for employment
was offered only l8o miles away by the opening of
the Kimberley diamond mines. Thither men flocked in
their thousands to work for money for guns, clothes
and agricultural implements and for the ten chillin^
tax imposed in 1869. By l875» out of a total population
of 227,325, of which the number of able-bodies men was
estimated at 2o,ooo, 15,000 men were gstting passes to
work outside the territory for long or short pe.riod.3,
and by 1884 this nember had doubled 'itself. ( W
The opening up of the Kimberley Gold Fields in the early l87O's created
a huge demand for food that both Basotho an.; Boer farmers stepped in to
meet. In 3.8?3, loo ,000 bags of grain and 2,000 bales oi wool were ex-
ported from L-sotho. (5o) In the following years there was a considerabl
increase in the circulation of mon&y and -the.establishment 01 trading
stations in Lesotho.(51) In 1878, fflfofrttio-"earned £^00.000 from experts
of grain and £75»000 from exports of wool.
The years following 1885 saw the opening of.the Witwatersrand Gold mines
Tylden records that, by 189^, "as many as 3o,ooo men were going out each
year to work on', these and other mines' and in the rest of South Africa.'1
(52) During the Anglo-Boer war of "1899-I9o2 it is estimated that "-he
Basotho sold 2o,ooo horses to the British array at an average price of
£16 each.
It is difficult to piece together an overview of Lesotho's history in
thiu period. Most authorities are agreed that Basutoland was used as a
pawn in a three-cornered power struggle between the British, the
of Capo Colony under the influences of Cecil Rhodes and the Boers- Out--
- though hardly ever in political and military
The sources drawn upon here are secondary: H.Ashton The B-?suto
(1967 2nd edition); G.Tylden The Raise of the Basuto (195CT;
R. Weisfelder 'The Basutho Monarchy. A spent force or a Dynamic Political
Factor? 'Afri&an Studies Association, November 1971.
(*+9) Ash ton Op.Cit. page 162
(50) The Pirn Report Op.Cit. page
(51) Tylden Op.'Cit. page 118
(52) Ibid page 197
(53) Ibid pages 2o5-2o6
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tactics - the Basotho nation under Moeshoeeh fought a brilliant but losing
struggle. Moeshoesh did not live to witness defeat and the final incorpo-
ration of B.sutoland as a British Crown Colony (188*0 but he was forced
to sign the "Peace of the Kaffir Corn" (5*0 which ended the second war
between Basutoland and the Orange Free State in 1866. Under the terms of
treaty the economic base of Basutoland's economy - the rich arable
to the west and south of the Caledon river - were incorporated in
tfe Orange Free State.
There followed at period of internal disintegration since Moeshoesh1s
son, Letsie, lacked the charisma of his father. To this was added the
customary benefit of British rule - the hut tax (55) - which helped to
ensure Basotho participation in the "cash" economy. Meanwhile, the Basotho
farmers on the west bank of the Caledon who were now forcibly incorpora-
ted into the Orange Free State became share-croppers, then squatters and,
finally, after the Act of Union which incorporated the Republic of South
Africa, wage labourers on the Boer farms.
The evidence for this argument is perhaps thin and the chain of reasoning
long. But rather than ignore Lesotho's pre-tewntieth century economic hi-
fi tory it is important to.-pu^ forward certain hypotheses for further re-
search. The hypothese pu'K forward here suggest that the present structure
of migrant labour, with all its "vicious-circles", did not emerge as the
Basotho responded to the demands of "modernization" but because a progress
of political and military domination was used to distort the Basotho eco-
nomy andto ensure that the Basotho obeyed the economic laws af "rationali-
ty11 that served the needs of others. The results of the conquest of south-
western Basutoland in the second Orange Free State - Basuto war did not
reveal themselves immediately. But the Ion-run consequences were a gradual
debilitation of the Lesotho economy. The opening of the Witwatersrand
Gold Mine occurred at a time when the Basuta were trying to .recover from,-
 l(
the disastrous " ^ u - - u ^ u ^ ^
inLi^ y 7%f <^^c<n7T^^»^a^^WJ^<Pr>nndftrmi-TTftri, By the time of the Boer War,
proletarianisation had reached the point when the oonditions of subsistan-
ce for the household economy of Lesotho required migrant labour in the
mines and farms and roads of South Africa.
The absolute nVmbers of Basoth labour migrants in the nineteenth century
and their size in relation to the total population suggests that it
would be unwise to ignore these migration currents for a full understands .
ing of the phenomenon of migrant labour today.
Specifically, that the response of the Basotho to the "opportunities" of
wage employment in South Africa is not conditioned primarily by the eco-
nomic depression of the 195o's and the simultaneous drought in Basutoland.
Rather, migration is the result of a combination of "push" and pull" fao-
tors that begin to operate simultaneously with the economic and political
domination over Basutoland by British and Boers. The net result is a si-
tuation in which the economic base of a self-sufficient Basotho economy
is destroyed. The urgent question facing Basutoland Today is the determi-
nation of a development strategy by which this economic independence
can be regained.
The very name of this "peace" says much for the economic "rationali-
ty" of the Basotho. It was made to keep the Boer commadoes out of the
maize fields on the east bank of the Caledon.
(55) The hut tax was introduced in 1870 when Basutoland was administered
by the Co.pe Government. The rate was lo shillings. An attempt to raise
the to 2o shilling helped spark o£f the Gun Wars mentioned above. In 1911
the hut tax was abolished and a poll tax introduced - hence unmarried men
became liable. In 192o the poll tax was raised to 25 shilling and in
1927 an education levy of 3 shillings was imposed.
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It is useful to compare this sketch of the process of
proletarianization in Lesotho with a scientific and thorough
study of the problem in Rhodesia to the north. (56) In his
analysis of the proletarianization of the African peasantry
in Rhodesia, Arrighi has argued that the supply of African
labour to the European farms and plantations was not, when
considered historicallyT primarily related to wage rates but
rather should be seen as a set of structural changes in which:-
(a) In the first stage - 1903-1922 - a set of "non-economic"
mechanisms such as land appropriation and the imposition of
taxation raisethe "effort price" of African participation in
the peasant economy.
(b) In the second stage, 1922 - 19^5 ca. , a process of self-
sustained underdevelopment has been set in motion. In this
period an increasing supply of labour is offered on the market
without a corresponding increase in wages. The momentum of
this process is sustained by a number of "vicious circle"
factors - soil erosion for exxample.
The broad conclusion of Arrighi's analsysisis that:-
While before 1922 African participation in the
labour market did not increase in periods of
falling real wages, after that year it always
increased irrespective of whether real wages
were falling, rising or remaining constant (57)
Three elements in Arrighi's analysis further illuminate the
process of proletarianization in Lesotho:-
(1) The wages of migrant workers were determined not by
market mechanisms but by the custom of the subsistence
wage: "Market mechanisms were largely discarded in the
determination of wages and the real wage came to be
customarily fixed at a level that would provide for a
subsistence of a single worker while working in the
capitalist sector and a small margin to meetthe more urgent
of the cash income requirements of his family (who
continued to reside in the peasant sector." (58) For a more
general analysis of the conditions governing the development
of underdevelopment in southern Africa this point would need
elaboration. The establishment of such a "subsistence" wage
in the colonial period is not simply the result of a quaint
historical tradition. The physical reproduction of the
C 56)Giovanni Arrighi 'Labour supplies in historical perspective
A study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in
Rhodesia1 Journal of Development Studies Vol 6 No 3* April 1970
(57) Arrighi Ibid page 205
(58) Ibid apage 200
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family unit requires both food crops and the wages of the
migrant worker (59). It was to this phenomenon we referred
earlier when arguing that, by the time of the Boer war, the
conditions of subsistence of the household economy in Lesotho
required adegree of migrant labour. We will return to the
point...
(2) Arrighi argues that the term "subsistence requirements" is
nptftnot to be understood in an exclusive, physiological sense and
that a part of the process of the distortion of the Rhodesfiian
economy was the substitution of demands that could be satisfied
within the peasant sector for demands that could only be
satisfied within the capitalist sector. While in the short
run, inperiods of falling real income, thi a consumption can be
cut back, in the long-run the result is that "African people
would be compelled to sell their labour time in order to
satisfy their subsistence requirements." (60) Arrighi describes
this process as the transformation of 'discretionary1 cash
requirements into Necessary1 requirements.
(5) The process of self-sustained underdevelopment which
occurred after 1922 was precipitated by a slump in cattle and
maize prices. There followed a sharp increase in labour
migration which set in motion a "vicious circle" or "cumulative
evil" since: "The future ability of the Africans who had
migrated to obtain their cash requirements through the sale
of produce was, of course, jeop^-ardised." (6l) The very reliance
of the household economy on cash remittances from migrant labour
meant that it was essential to retain extended family ties at
all costs. This peculiar type of economy in which the migrant
labour subvents the production of the household plot which in
turn subvents the wages of the migrant requires that the social
relationships of the family had to be defended at all cost -
(59^)Exactly now the subsistence wage is determined is a very
complex matter. Under normal conditions, wages must cover
the costs of reproduction of the household unit. But,when
food crops and cash crops subvent, in effect, wages then
wages can fall below costs of reproduction. The sameis true
of theprices paid for cash crops whenthese are subvented by
food crops and/or labour wages. The point has been made by
Bettelheim: "In the countries where there are a large number
of producers who produce for the market only to a minor extent,
the prices of theproducts placed on the market under these
conditions have an extremely complex relation to their cost in
money or in labour, for these costs do not directly play the role
of regulator. It is thus possible for prices to fall, for an
indefinite period, below these costs of production," 'Theoretical
Comments by Charles Bettelheim in Arghiri Emmanuel Unequal Exchange
(1972) Appendix 1, page 298
(60) Arrighi Op. Cit. page 212 ;.
(61) Ibid page 217 • 1
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oven when this deference appeared irrational to agricultural extension
u'lv i ::ors i>na others concerned with the problem of soil erosion and the
vicio-j.-i circle of err-iiac-rat ion in the pc-asnnt economy. (62)
There are many parallels between the Rhodesian experience of proletaria-
nizati '--i and that of Lesotho. This is not surprising given the similari-
ties in their hiatorical experience. But there are also 'dissimilarities
and it would be a mistake to apply Rhodesian experience without considering
these differences.
In Rhodesia, the slump in Rhodes' speculative bubble in I9o2-l9o? led to
a decision 'o promote European farms. To do so required control over the
A fricrui labour supply, la South Africa, there was no parallel crisis - t he-
mining F.I.-C tor continued to expand. Furthermore, the me sure-s which led to
an increase in the "effort price" of Basotho participation in the peasant
economy operated differently. As we saw earlier, in the last quarter of
the nine teenth century Basutoland responded to an increase in economic
•tc Livity outside its "borders" by increasing both the supply of cash crops
and pro(:(.:'-••'-• an the supply of migrant labour. Furthermore the penetration,
^oth mil L u-::ry and commercial, oi Basutoland which resulted in an increase
in the discretionary requiremen s of the Basotho - especially of firearm -
had taken place much earlier. In sum, the process of sulf-sustained under-
development in Basutoland is brcugtitt about in a different way. There is
no clo-?r division into two historical periods of preparation and "take-
off" for the conditions that lead to the unlimited supply of labour in tn^
dual economy of which Lesotho is a part. The massive extent of the pres-
sure exorcised by Boers and British anti the exigecies of war have the
o ffect og "concertining" a process that occured over a longer period and
a later date in Rhodesia.
i
The starting pant for this search for an alternative way of conceptualizing
the origins arrS dynamics of migrant labour in Lesotho was partly the in-
adequacy of such suggested- causes as the economic depression of the- 193o s'
end parr.ly the a-historical approach to the problem in current social
science literature.- By focussing attention on the "push" and "pull" factors
that brought about proletarianization of African Labour in Rhodesia,
Arrifthi throws considerable light on the analysis of the process of prole--
tarianiz?! tion as such. What is particularly fruitful is not the historic?"
specification of the conditions og fproletarianization - which are, of
course, unique to Rhodesia - but the method of analysis.
(62) ie. what appears "irrational" from the point of view of economic man
is quite rational from the point of view of the household in the economy
of the labour reserve: - "Low wages and lack of security in the capitalist
sector maintained the African worker's interest in the security afforded
by membership of a rural-based kinship group; at the sam^ time, facing
opportunities for A Triean participation in the produce market made the
pesantry at large more reliant on wage-workers' remittances for their cash
requirements. There was therefore little incentive for all involved to
bereak up traditional structures which in some ways tended to hamper in-
novation in techniques and patterns of production. For example, in the
1930s' 'centralization' of arable land came to be considered as a measuru-
necessary to to prevent haphazard interspersing of ar-able and grazing land
which was one of the main causes of soil erosion. This innovation, how-
ever, made it increasingly difficult to provide land for a growing- family
in the vicinity of the prarents' kraal, with the result that either the f
family holding had to be fragmented, or the family itself. As the latter
alternative would undermine social hohesion, centralization was resisted
or, if implemented it led to exessive fragmentation of holdings and further
deterioration in land fertility." Arrighi Ibid pages 218-219.
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Vv *. ln doinn so Arrighi, as is well known, challenges the hegemony of dualist
) • * theories of econmic growth.
•j j,
".-;'; His critique of the dualist theory is based on "Arthur Lewis' exposition
jj-ij; of economic development with unlimited supplies of labouur. (63) Lewis had
'J"£> . argued that a strategy of industrial development was possible in the dual
l; f . economy in conditions Sf for example acute land shortage where the margi-
•i:'^ nal productivity of labour in the "subsistence" sector was zero or even ne-
^£- gativo. Under these condition an almost (6*0 unlimited supply of labour
is avialable to capitalist sector at a wage that is sufficient to pull
labour out of the "subsistence" sector - a wage which Lewis estimated to
be 3o-5o# above the "subsistence" wage. Certainly, the dualist model of
economic growth has undergone considerable changes sinee 195*t. (65) Selwynfe
analysis of spatial and social dualism in Lesotho is not based on the
Lewis' model as such but on Singer's reformulation of it. (66)
Nevertheless, at least two. fundamental weaknesses of the model do' remain
in Singer's reformulation and in Selvyn's application of this to the
economic development of Lesotho. One is the failure to specify the histo-
rical circumstances under which the dualist model appplies. We woiald,
perhaps,.accept that the dualist model a a descriptive paradigm has been
largely true of the colonial period of Lesotho's history (from l88*+ to 1/
1966). But there are no inherent reasons for assuming that hhis will always
be so. Vis-avis Rhodesia, Arrighi argues that the dualist model ae formul-
ated by Lewis ceases to apply in the post-war period when, because of
structural changes in the Rhodesian economy as a whole, wage rates begin
to rase and hence the conditions of the dualist model no longer apply.
We wcuid net-d to look closer at the structure of the economy of Southern
Africa as a whole in ordor to determine this.
A second weakness is the tendency to treat the decriptive paradigm as
explanation. Hence Selwyn argues that "unskilled labour wages have been
kept down not only by the existence of a pool of unemployed but also by the
weak bargaining position of African workers resulting from discriminatory
legislation." (67) As we hare argued above, it is not the existence of
af "pool of unemployed" but the conditions that have brought about a perroa-
(63) W.A. Lewis Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour
the Manchester School, May, 195^.
(6*t) Lewis has a number of qualifications to the argument: among them the
•-:-. argument that technological develoment in the subsistence sector may lead
to an increase in the productivity of peasant labour in this sector.
(65) Lewis has been criticised, in the South African context, in a number
of ways. Francis Wilson, for example, argues that Lewis fails to distinguisl
between the "either-or11 migrant and "oscillating" migrant. He writes:"There
are two tjpes of workers >who come from the 'subsistence1 sector of a de-
veloping economy. One is the mar. who makes the either-pr decision; who has
to choose wheter he will stay where he is, or pull up his roots and move
permanently to town. Making allowance for the attractions of living in a .
big city, he will decide to go only if his expected earnings there ar at
least &a large (allowing for cost of living difference) as they would be on
the land. In other words, his rural income sets the lower limit on what he
must be paid elsewhere. It was this type of worker that W. Arthur Lewis im-
: plicitly analysed in his study of economic development with unlimited supp-
lies of labour. But there is a second type of man, typidified by those who
work on the gold mines, for .whom the subsistence sector has a different con-
sequence. The oscillating migrant does not take an either-or decision, he
goes to town primarily to supplment the .income. Exactly the reverse is true
of the either-or man; the more he can earn on the land the more will he nee<
to earn in town to induce him to go there." Francis Wilson Labour in the
South African Gold. «Ka nes 1911-1969, Cambridge University Press 197.1-
(66) H.'W. Singer ' Dim 1 ism revisited - a new approach to the problem of the
dual society -j
 n developing countries' Journ- o^ Development Studies vol 7»
No. 1. . . , . . . -— ~~
( f - ' . l ) * . - > " • v - - • . . - • : . - , - .
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nent distortion of the economy of Lesotho and undermined its surplus-
gerating capacity that bring about the low wages. The pool of unemployed
cannot be regarded as an independent variable in the analysis of. the
African labour market. The existence of labour surplus - the reserve army
of the unemployed - is treated in the dualist analysis a a cause of the
low wages paid in the mender n sector. However Francis Wilson' s analysis
of the factors governing the remuneration of black miners in the South / 'r
African gold mines emphasizes that a chronic shortage of black labour
has 'been a perpetual feature of South African economic history. The crux
of the matter is that the dualist analysis - while insiting on its decrip-
tive character - develops a model of underdevelopment according to which
low wages in the modern sector are brought a bout by low opportunity c c
costs in the traditional sector. But it is the structural character of
migration that is the root of low wages in both 'modern1 and 'traditional'
sectors.
Section Three: Migrant Labour and the Devevelopment of Underdevelopment.
A. The Sconomy of the Labour reserve as a development strategy.
This paper began with a brief sketeh of current development strategies
in Lesotho and went on to examine current social science interpretations
of development in Lesotho. We have, throughout, insisted that the "dis-
tortion" of the economy of the Basotho from a fundamentally self-suffi-
cient peasant economy into a labour reserve of the South African economy
is the key to understanding Lesotho's current predicaments. And.yet, most
social science interpretations of Lesotho's sturcture and development
choices tend to accept fce underlying structure of the labour reserve eco-
nomy as part of the fundament of their analysis - as a corner stone on
which development plans are based rather than as the chief obstacle to a
development strategy which could ensure that the economic surplus gene-
rated by tBve labour of the Basotho accumulates in Lesoth and not, as at
present, to South Africa and to the international capital which is in-
vested there.
This characteristic of most analyses of labour reserve economies has beei.
attacked by Samir Amin in a recent paper. (68) He argues that it is
characteristic of marginalist economic theory to regard the existing de-
stribution of the factors of production - labour and cnpital (69) - as a
given. Amin insists that in Senegal the existing distribution of labour
and capital is the result of the development strategy of the colonial pe-
riod which brought about an extension of peanu agriculture. An alterna-
tive development strategy based on the development of intensive, irriga-
ted agriculture of rice, market produce etc. is precluded by the re-
quirements of international capitalism. Hence development policies direc-
ted towards the extension of the peanut crop are not for Senegal either
more or less "rational". Whether they are rational or not depends on the
underlying devlopment strategy. The argument deserves quoting: -
Samir Amin 'Contemporary Migrations in West Africa1. Paper delivered
to Conference on strategies of economic development - Africa compared
with Latin America, 4-17 September, 1972- UN Africa Insttute for Economic
Development and Planning, Dakar.
(69) Amin admits that the immobile factor, land, may alter the picture
but not for the manufacturing sector.
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There is no "economic rationality" in itself, independent
from the pint of view on which it is based. What is rational
from Senegal' s point of vic-w - fehe exploitation of the Fleuve
- is not so from the point of view of the world system, be-
cause self-sufficient economies based on this alternative
would have difficult in "reimbursing" capital, which would
then appear as real aid. On the other hand, what is irratio-
nal from Senegal's point of view - the extension of peanut,
agriculture - is perfectly rational from the point of view
of the world system. Because of the deterioration of the terms
of exchange, from which Senegal cannot escape as a reslut of
its export based economy (peanuts bust be exported);, what is
"unfortunate" for this country, will be "beneficial" for the
world system and it is this that determines its choice. (7o)
Amin's analysis is also illuminating in that he attempts a cost-benefit ana-
lysis of the migration of labour from the West African interior to the c
coast. This analysis is not based on the existing distribution of the fac-
tors of production. This would not be possible since current development
strategy does not provide capital and hence employment opportunities in
Est African interior. Amin's analysis contracts current remittances from
the labour of migrants (estimated at Sl8 million par year) with estimates
of the profits made by coastal planters from the labour of migrants(at
approximately 875 million).
Amin's conclusion is clearly that the whole export-oriented, foreign
capital basis of hte economy of the labour reserve must be called into
question before an estimate can be made of the cost and benefits of labour
migration. But, unless theis calculation is to be a purely academic exer-
cise, unrelated to the considereation of how to effect alternative dovelop-
men strategies, the analysis must be tied to the analysis of the social
and political forces that could effectuate a challenge to the basic axioms
of current etrategiffi of underdevelopment.
B. The Politics of the Labour Reserve Economy
As we have seen, explanations of the diversiveness of political strife in
Lesotho tend to emphasize that the two major political parties - The
Basutuland National Party and the Basutoland National Congress - have dif-
ferent conceptions of the nature of the Basutho nation and of its position
in South African and world affairs. While the BNP accepts the need for a
dialogue with South Africa (though the BNP rejects aprtheid and the racial
list policies of the Rhodesian regime) the BRP envisages Lesotho's inde-
pendence as only one step in a struggle for the total liberation of
Southern Africa. Vis-a-vis labour migration, the BftP has demanded greater
control and supervision of the contracs, pay and conditions of serviee of
Basotho migrant workers whereas the BNP has tended to adopt a more lais-
ser-faire attitude.
These differing conceptions are not the result of a purely "ideological"
difference (in the sense in which functionalist analysis interprets ide-
ology - ie. unrelated to social formations) but have their roots in the
different classes and strata that Lesotho's historical development has
given rise to. The BNP is rooted in the institution of chieftanship and
the catholic church. The BBP was established primarily by schoolteachers,
with support from Protestants but with its real roots among the migrant
workers. Hence to analyse the capacity of the fiJCPto articulate and effec-
tuate an alternative developmert strategy requires, among other tlaiags,
an analysis of migrant labour as a social formation.
(7o) Amin Ibid page 26 "~ r
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_ - _- . nnalyoiu o-f-fri»«~wrdn-ek>*elui>cd -v^zld-. Bourgeois
social science tends to take the present arrangement of the factors of
production as a given quantum and hence to evaluate development policies
in terms cf txisting merket .^ forces. Marxist science regards existing
arrangements of productive factors as the product of colonial power and,
•it .T$' more- fundamental level, of the contradictions that the imperialist
slngr: of capitalist developmen in the West has given rise to. But more spt-~
cific analyses of the mediation of international capitalism in gpeevf i i P<^^~^
historical and cultural circumstances - such cs the labour reserve economies
of Southern Africa - are thin on the ground. Hence, the the speculative
nature of much of the argument that has been put forward.
A basic problem in assessing Marxist and non-Marxist esplanations of a
specific condition of underdevelopment is the question of reconcilability.
Is there a fundamental irreconcilability between Marxist.and bourgeois •
social science ? While bourgeois social science has tended to dismiss
Marxist analysis by misrepresenting Marxism as a purely "economic" interpre-
tation or by regarding Marxism as an-ideology or religion which justifies
and re-assures, marxist science has tended to dismiss bourgeois social
science as ideology and stressed the "epistemological break" that distin-
guishes bourgeois apologetics from Marxist science.
Wheter thore is a fundamental irreconcilability between Marzist and non-
MarKist science is a complex matter. Given that the purpose of Marxist ana-
lysis is not to describe btefc to change, Marxist analysis is inherently re-
volutionary. Theory and analysis is a weapon in the organizational, cultur-
al and militp^ pj liberation struggle. Bourgeois social science emerges out
of that situation which is the subject for analysis. Theory and analysis have
n^re an ideological fundtion in terms of legitimizing the structure (however
disparate and seemingly pluralist) of power and privilege.
On the other hand it is hard to locat, historically^an epistemolocal break
in the development of Marxist thought. (73) Clearly, in the development of
the thought of Marx and Engels a great deal is owt:d to a process of selec-
tive borrowing. Indeed, on account of the development of Marx's economic
thought emphasizes that Marx's major writings hinge on a proper understan-
ding of Ricardo's theory of labour value. (7*0 Furthermore, all the histo-
rical work of Marx and Engels is based on data that could obviously not
be regarded as "marxist". Hence the position of the self-proclaimed marxist
who rejects the finding os bourgeois social science on the basis of his
revolutionary intentions is clearly impermissible.
But the question of compatibility obviously goes deeper than the somewhat
trite observation that both Marx and Engels were- historians. Given that
social science is part of the system of cultural hegemony its domination, is
only total if class.• domination is ttttal. The hegemony of 'modern* social sci-
ence is no stronger than the hegemony of the imperialist system..
The dominant:; p-jsitison of the US in the imperialist bloc is t&day under
challenge. (75) One consequence of this is that the hegemony of US social
and political science is undergoing e crisis. The years of facile optimism
about political "development" and "modernization" are a thing of the past
and the methodology which gave rist to such thinking is also under attack.
A body of literature is amerging which offers a trenchant critique of this
(73) Despite the efforts of Althusser, Balibar and Poulantzas
(7*0 Ernest Mandel The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx. (1971)
chapter 3
(75) See Ernest Handel Europe versus America ? Contrdictions of Imperialism
(I97o) and Christel Neusiiss Imperalismus und VfeLtmarktbewegung des Kapitals
(1972)
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branch of comparative politics : its ideological and ethnocentric assump-
tions, theoretical inadequacy and inefficacy as a guide to policy. (76)
The reactions to this critique have been varied. Gome have "abandoned any
claim to theoretical generality and retreated into case studies and area f *•
studies. Others are engaed in a frantic effort to resurrect a new "science"
og political economy which will borrow some of the terminology of Marxism
but strip it of its historical materialism and its revolutionary objectives
in the imperialist struggle. The result is, frequently, a hodgepodge of
unrelated 'coneepts1,'variables' and 'models ' that serve little purpose
other than to divert themselves andt their students from substantial issues.
On the other hand the existence of this cttsis does enable us to operato
with an "epistemological threslyjld^ (77) in which we can hope'to measure
the adequacy of existing explanation to explaifi reality unencumbered by
the methodological bdggage of current social science literature on moder-
nization and pTjiii tti»a»l development. Were this not so there would be no
feasible way of validating or criticising existing social science litera-
ture on the economy of Lesotho. Nor wuld there be any point to the exerci-
se.
(76) A.G Frank 'Socialogy of Development and undervelopment of Socialogy1
in A.G, Frank Latin America: Underdevelopment or R•• vulution (1969):
James Pock 'The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers' in
America's Asia: Dessenting Esaays on Asian-American Relations by Edward
Friedman and Mark Selden (ed)(1969):Lars Rudebeck 1Pilitical Development:
Toward a coherent and relevant theoretical formulation of the cencept1
Scandinavian Political Studies 5/l97o: Henry Bernstein 'Modernization
Theory and the Sociological Study of Development1 in Journal of Develop-
ment Studies Vol 7 No 2, January, 1971: Maj Palmberg 'Den Funktionalistiske
Utvecklingsteorin1 (the functionalist theory of develoment) in Hafton for
Kritiska Studier 1-2, 1971: Jose F. Ocampo & Drtle L. Johnson 'The Concept
of Political Development' in Cockroft et al. Latin America's Political E-
conomy (1972): Raymond B. Pratt 'The Underdeveloped Political Science of
Development' in Studies in Comparative International Development Vol 8
No 1, Spring,197?
(77) The concept has been borrowed, somewhat out of context, from
Pierre Vilar 'Marxist History, a history in the Making: Dialogue with
Althuseer ' New Left Review no 8o, July^August 1973.
